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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS, SfTATE OF UTAH 
VARIAN - EIMAC, INC., and/or 
EMPLOYERS MUTUAL LIABILITY 
INSURANCE, 
Petitioners/Appellants, 
v. 
HELEN D. LAMOREAUX, THE SECOND 
INJURY FUND, and THE UTAH 
STATE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, 
Respondents. 
COURT OF APPEALS 
Case No. 870344-CA 
Category 6 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT HELEN D. LAMOREAUX 
JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is proper in this Cqurt pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. Section 35-1-83 (1987 Supp.). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
[1953] 
the requirements of this 
The Respondent submits that the issue of timely filing 
is governed by the following statutes and rules: 
UCA Section 35-1-33 
A substantial compliance with 
title shall be sufficient to give effeat to the orders of the 
commission, and they shall not be declared inopperative, illegal 
on word for any ommission of a technical nature. 
U.C.A. Section 35-1-20 [1953] 
All orders of the commission within its jurisdiction 
shall be presumed reasonable and lawful! until they are found 
otherwise in an action brought for that purpose, or unt-il altered 
or revoked by the commission. 
Respondent's timely filing is also governed by 35-1-
82.55 which provides: 
Every motion tor review shall be in 
writing, and shall specify in detail the 
particular errors and objections. Such 
motions must be filed within fifteen days 
of the date of any order of the administra-
tive law judge or commission unless further 
time is granted by the administrative law 
judge or commission within fifteen days, 
and unless so filed, said order shall 
bescome the award of the commission and 
shall be final. 
The question of legal causation is governed by U.C.A. 
Section 35-1-45 [Supp. 1987] and the cases of this state's courts 
interpreting that statute, in particular Allen v. Industrial 
Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah, 1986). 
Section 35-1-45 (Supp. 1987) provides: 
Every employee mentioned in Section 
35-1-43 who is injured, and the dependants 
of every such employee who is killed, by 
accident arising out of or in the court of 
his employment, wherever such injury 
occurred, if the accident was not purposely 
self-inflicted, shall be paid compensation 
for loss sustained on account of the injury 
or death, and such amount for medical, 
nurse and hospital services and medicines, 
and, in case of death, such amount of 
funeral expenses, as provided in this chap-
ter. The responsibility for compensation 
and payment of medical, nursing and hospi-
tal services and medicines, and funeral 
expenses provided under this chapter shall 
be on the employer and its insurance 
carrier and not on the employee. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On July 24, 1986, Helen D. Lamoreaux filed an applica-
tion for Hearing with the Utah State Industrial Commission. Mrs. 
Lamoreaux, the Respondent, sought compensation for an injury sus-
tained in the course of her employment with Petitioner Varian -
Eimac, Inc., on November 15, 1985. Petitioners filed an answer 
denying that the injury to Mrs. Lamoreaux was compensable. On 
November 17, 1986, a hearing was held before Administrative Law 
Judge Gilbert A. Martinez, following which Mrs. Lamoreaux was 
referred to a medical panel. Judge Martinez subsequently issued 
his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, in which he 
found a medical causal relationship between Mrs. Lamoreaux's 
injuries and her employment with Petitioner. However, Judge 
Martinez "reluctantly" denied compensation, based on his 
understanding of Allen v. Industrial Cojmmission, 729 P. 2d 15 
(1986) (R. at 261). Respondent filed a 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law an 
Motion for Review of the 
a Order, pointing out: (1) 
compensation should be awarded under Allen, Supra, and (2) 
compensation should be awarded because Mrs. Lamoreaux's so-called 
pre-existing injury also arose out of her employment with Peti-
tioner. The Industrial Commission issued an Order granting com-
pensation on the grounds that Respondent had not brought a 
personal risk to the work place and therefore the policy demands 
of Allen were met. Petitioners appealep. this Order. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. In February, 1980, Helen D. Lamoreaux began working 
for Petitioner Varian - Eimac, Inc. (R. at 32.) 
2. Mrs. Lamoreaux at that time, had no back problems 
or pain of any kind. (R. at 27, 18, 246.) 
3. Mrs. Lamoreaux had injured her back 28 years 
previously? however, this injury was to her middle back area, not 
the lower back, and had healed completely. (R. at 26, 256.) 
4. Mrs. Lamoreaux's assignment, beginning in November, 
1982, with Petitioner was preping and loading x-ray tubes, which 
involved lifting weights up to 100 pounds up to 90 times a day, as 
well as torquing to assemble the tubes. (R. at 33-37.) 
5. Mrs. Lamoeaux continued in this job until September 
of 1985. (R. at 38.) 
6. As a result of this assignment, Mrs. Lamoreaux had 
occasional back pain which caused her to seek chiropractic and 
medical treatment. She did not, however, miss a single day's 
work due to this discomfort. (R. at 28, 29, 37, 38.) 
7. This discomfort was not in the same place in Mrs. 
Lamoreaux's back as the subsequent injury of November 15, 1985. 
(R. at 38.) 
8. On November 15, 1985, Mrs. Lamoreaux's work 
involved lifting, from the floor, turning and carrying, 18 1/2 
pound objects 40 to 60 times a day (R. at 39, 271.) 
9. At this time, November 15J 1985, Mrs. Lamoreaux1 s 
previous back problem was "completely quiescent'1 (R. at 246.) 
10. On November 15, 1985, Mrsl Lamoreaux was lifting a 
Bl-90 center and turned to the right to| walk down the hall, 
twisting her back. (R. at 39, 279.) 
11. As she twisted her back, Mrs. Lamoreaux testified 
that she felt a sharp pain in her lower back, which later 
radiated to her left leg. (R. at 39, 249, 279.) 
12. As a result, Mrs. Lamoreaux suffered a ruptured 
invertabral disk which was caused by the lifting, turning and 
carrying motion made while carrying the|Bl-90 centers. (R. at 
187, 194. 207, 256.) 
13. Medical testimony and reports show that lifting an 
18 1/2 pound object and turning to the right can cause invertabral 
disk herniation. (R. at 248, 249, 256.) 
14. Mrs. Lamoreaux was temporarily totally disabled 
from November 21, 1985 through June 23, 1986. (R. at 257.) 
15. On December 17, 1985, a partial laminectomy of the 
left L-5 Lamina with left L5-S1 disk excpision was performed. (R. 
at 122.) 
16. While this operation eliminated the radiating leg 
pain, Mrs. Lamoreaux's lifestyle and physical abilities have been 
severely limited as residuals of her disk herniation and 
subsequent surgery. (R. at 45-51, 220-225, 248.) 
17. Mrs. Lamoreaux, as a result of this injury, has a 
15% whole* person permanent partial impairment. (R. at 249, 257.) 
18. Gilbert A. Martinez, Administrative Law Judge, 
found that there was "a direct medically causal connection 
between applicant's low back problems and the industrial incident 
of November 14, 1985." (R. at 256.) 
19. Administrative Law Judge Martinez further found 
that "the incident at work in lifting an 18 1/2 pound object and 
turning to the right can indeed cause an intervertebral disk 
herniation." (R. at 256.) 
20. However, Administrative Law Judge Martinez 
"reluctantly" denied compensation, in spite of the medical causal 
connection. (R. at 261.) 
21. On review, the Industrial Commission, citing Allen 
v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah, 1986) said: 
To meet the legal causation requirement, a claimant 
with a pre-existing condition must show, that the employ-
ment contributed something substantial to increase the 
risk he already faced in everyday life because of his 
condition ... this extra exertion serves to offset the 
pre-existing condition of the employee as a likely cause 
of the injury, thereby eliminating claims from impair-
ments resulting from a personal risk rather than exer-
tions at work. [Allen, at 25]. 
If the purpose of applying the higher causation 
standard is to prevent the employer from being liable 
for a risk not created by that employer, then it does 
not serve that purpose to apply that higher standard to 
cases where the contributing pre-existing condition is 
one which developed due to work duties with the same 
employer responsible for the most recent accident. 
6 
On this basis, the Commission awarded Mrs. Lamoreaux compensation 
constant with the Findings of the Administrative Law Judge. (R. 
at 285, 286.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
f the employee has a pre-
The Utah Workers Compensation law, in U.C.A. Section 35-
1-45 (Supp. 1987) requires that each claimant's injuries be a 
result of an accident, which is causally related, legally and 
medically, to the claimant's employment] Allen v. Industrial 
Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah, 1986). 
existing condition, the event causing tike injury must be unusual 
exertion not common to normal daily livinq to meet the legal 
causation prong of the test. 
The present case involves an employee who entered the job 
with no pre-existing condition. Thereafter, the claimant had some 
back problems with her back in the course of her employment. The 
employee, Helen D. Lamoreaux, then began a new assignment with the 
same employer. This job involved lifting, turning, and carrying 
20 pound objects up to sixty times a day. The cumulative result 
of these exertions was the cause of an injury of the Respondent's 
lower back. 
The Industrial Commission properly awarded Mrs. 
Lamoreaux compensation for her injuries! Cumulative exertions 
resulting in injuires have often been compensated by the Supreme 
Court. Further, the repetitiveness of these efforts is clearly-
unusual, as defined in Allen, and subsequent court decisions. As 
the purpose of this high legal causation standard is to protect 
employers Erom compensating employees who bring a personal risk 
to the jobr the Petitioner is not entitled to its protection when 
the risk was caused in the course of the same employment. The 
award of the Commission is correct in the application of the 
standard and in the purpose of the legal causation test. 
The Respondents Motion for Review was timely filed and 
the Industrial Commission had authority to enter its Order. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S RULING PROPERLY 
APPLIES THE LEGAL CAUSATION STANDARD IN ALLEN 
AS WELL AS ITS UNDERLYING POLICY AND SHOULD 
BE AFFIRMED. 
A. The aggravation of a pre-existing injury as a cumu-
lative result of repetative, unusual exertions meets the legal 
causation test announced in Allen. 
The Supreme Court/ in Allen v« Industrial Commission/ 
729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986)/ announced clearly the standard to be 
used in evaluating industrial injuries for compensation. Peti-
tioner agrees that the injuries suffered by the Respondent/ Helen 
Lamoreaux/ were the result of an accident, as defined in Allen. 
Petitioner also agrees that these injuries were a direct medical 
result of the accident which Ms. Lamoreaux experienced while 
working for the Petitioner. Rather, Petitioner attacks the 
ruling of Industrial Commission on the grounds that since Ms. 
8 
Lamoreaux was injured previously while 
entitled to protection from liability b^ 
standard announced in Allen. However, 
applied, the injuries to Ms. Lamoreaux 
The Supreme Court has long re 
which is the cumulative result of repet 
sable by Workmen's Compensation. See M| 
sion, 728 P.2d 1023 (Utah 1986); Kaiser 
n their employ, they are 
the higher legal 
^ven when this standard is 
e compensable. 
ized that an injury 
ive exertions is compen-
era v. Industrial Commis-
ar 
cogn 
it 
Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888 (Utah 1981); Schmidt v. Industrial Commis-
sion, 617 P.2d 1693 (Utah 1980); United 
Draper, 613 P.3d 508 (Utah 1980); (pre-
vated or added to in course of work); _ 
Commission, 16 Utah 2d 260, 399 P.2d 20 
Miera, Supra is significant in 
Allen and applied the higher legal caus 
case the employee periodically jumped 
then to the bottom (two, four-foot jump 
(a total of eight times).' The onset of 
Court, applying Allen, said that these 
ably greater exertion than that encount 
and therefore are legally sufficient". 
Further, in Allen itself, the Court sai 
exertion was unusual depended on "how 
the Claimant, the distance the crates 
Existing condition aggra-
C^fling v. Industrial 
it 
orit 
Steel Corporation v. 
States Steel Co. v. 
(1965). 
that it was decided after 
ion standard. In that 
o a shelf in a hole, 
) at half hour intervals 
the pain was gradual. The 
Exertions were "consider-
ed in non-employment life 
Miera, at 1024, 1025. 
i r 
d t h a t whether A l l e n ' s 
m i^ny c r a t e s were moved by 
w0re moved, t h e p r e c i s e 
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weight of the crates, and the size of the area in which the 
lifting and moving took place'1. Allen, at 28. 
In our case, Helen Lamoreaux was injured on November 15, 
1985. Her job at the time involved lifting Bl-90 x-ray tubes, 
weighing about 20 pounds each, from the floor, turning and carry-
ing the Bl-90, and setting it down. This was repeated every day, 
40 to 60 times a day. Typical non-employment exertions include 
carrying garbage cans and luggage, and lifting small children. 
They do not include lifting, turning and carrying 20 pound 
objects 40 to 60 times a day, any more than they include making 
four foot jumps into a hole (Miera) or slipping an arm under a 
person to raise them while straightening their shirt (Richfield 
Care Center v. Torgerson, 733 P.2d 178 (Utah 1987) (applying 
Allen higher legal causation standard). 
This case is very similar to Kaiser Steel Corporation 
v. Monfredi, Supra. The applicant had been a miner for 27 years 
and had a history of back problems. He aggravated these pre-
existing problems while shoveling. The Court, noting the "recog-
nized rule of construction [that] resolves any doubt respecting 
the right of compensation in favor of the injured employee" and 
the principle that "the compensation statutes should be liberally 
construed in favor of recovery" affirmed the award of the Indus-
trial Commission, supra, at 892, quoting McPhie v. Industrial 
Commission, 567 P.2d 153 (Utah 1977). 
10 
In both Monfredi and the case 
exertion preceding the injury was not s 
However, the Court looked at the cumul 
ing. Likewise it was the repetative li 
carrying, which produced Helen Lamoreau 
clearly meets the standard set by Allen 
at 
B. The Industrial Commission 
at bar, the actual 
trenuous in and of itself, 
ive exertion of shovel-
fcting, turning and 
pc's injuries. This 
s ruling granting com-
pensation satisfies the policy concerns of Allen by protecting 
employer's from compensating injuries which pre-date employment 
The Court, in Allen, Supra, stated the standard for 
legal causation where there are pre-existing injuries, and also 
c lea r ly a r t i c u l a t e d the purpose and polfLcy behind t h i s r u l e ; when 
i t sa id : 
To meet the legal causation requirement, a 
claimant with a pre-existing condition must 
show that the employment contributed something 
substantial to increase the risk he already 
faced in every day life because of his 
condition. . .This extra exertion serves to 
offset the pre-existing condition of the 
employee as a likely cause of the injury, 
thereby eliminating claims from impairments 
resulting from a personal risk rather than 
exertions at work. (Allen at 25). 
The Court further cited Professor Larson as saying that 
"if there is no personal causal contribution, that is, if there 
is no prior weakness or disease, any exertion connected with the 
[injury] as a matter of medical fact is adequate to satisfy the 
legal test of causation". Larson, Workmen's Compensation, Sec-
tion 38.83(b), at 7-278 (1986). 
11 
The purpose, then, is to protect employers from claims 
based on injuries which, while they occur on the job, are not 
related to the work being done by the employee. Helen Lamoreaux, 
however, had no back pain or injury when she began to work for 
Petitioner in February, 1980. All the problems which she 
experienced prior to November 15, 1985, arose out of her employ-
ment for Petitioner. In the language of the Court, there was no 
"personal risk" which Helen Lamoreaux brought with her in 1980. 
Since there was no "personal causal contribution. . ., any exer-
tion connected with the [injury] as a matter of medical fact 
adequate to satisfy the legal test of causation", Allen, at 26. 
Important to note is that the Medical Panel found no pre-existing 
injury and Helen Lamoreaux began employment for Petitioner in 
1980. (Record P. 246, Medical Panel Report.) 
In granting Helen Lamoreaux compensation for her 
injuries the Industrial Commission made Findings of Fact which 
carefully took into account the medical reports and the personal 
history of the Claimant and made a decision based on credible 
evidence. It was not "arbitrary or capricious". Residential and 
Commercial Construction Co. vs. Industrial Commission, 529 P.2d 
427 (Utah, 1974). The Commission applied Allen according to its 
clearly articulated purpose. In doing so, it rejected claims by 
the Petitioner that it be shielded from liability because Mrs. 
Lamoreaux had been previously injured while in its employ. 
12 
Nor does the Industrial Commission's award generate 
confusion as Petitioner fears. Medical 
tion causation between the accident and 
conditions. For example, in Richfield Care Center v. Torgerson 
Supra, the Court made an award apportioned between three 
injuries. (2.5% to pre-existing conditions; 2.5% to a 1980 
injury; 2.5% to the accident.) Significantly, this case was 
decided using the Allen test and involved a pre-existing condi-
tion as well as a second injury from th^ same employment. The 
Court stated that slipping an arm under 
and reaching around to straighten his slfiirt met the legal causa-
tion standard. 
However, the case at bar diffeirs from Torgerson in as 
much as Helen Lamoreaux had no condition pre-existing her employ-
boards routinely appor-
several pre-existing 
a patient to raise him 
ment with Petitioner. (See Record P. 2f6, Record of Medical 
Panel.) 
The Petitioner's argument would allow an employer whose 
work caused 100% of the injured worker's injury to escape 
liability when the injured worker brought no personal risk (no 
pre-existing injury) at the time of employment. Such and 
argument does not meet the policy of the Workers Compensation Act 
as it existed by Court decisions prior to Allen and would violate 
the policy and formula set out in Allen 1 Thus, the Industrial 
Commission's award should be affirmed. 
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POINT II 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION HAD JURISDICTION 
TO ENTER ITS ORDER BASED UPON RESPONDANT'S 
MOTION FOR REVIEW. 
A. Respondent's Motion for Review was Timely Filed. 
Utah Code Annotated Section 35-1-82.53 provides for the 
review of an Order from an Administrative Law Judge or the 
Commission. It provides: 
(1) Any party in interest who is 
dissatisfied with the order entered by an 
administrative law judge or the commission 
may file a motion for review of such order. 
Upon the filing of such motion to review 
his order the administrative law judge may 
(a) reopen the case and enter a supplemen-
tal order after holding such further 
hearing and receiving such further evidence 
as he may deem necessary; or (b) amend or 
modify his prior order by a supplemental 
order; or (c) refer the entire case to the 
commission. If the administrative law 
judge makes a supplemental order, as pro-
vided above, it shall be final unless a 
motion to review the same shall be filed 
with the commission. 
The time within which a Motion for Review must be filed 
is governed by Utah Code Annotated Section 35-1-55, Rule 490-1-5, 
Workers Compensation Rules and Regulations and Rule 6(a) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Section 35-1-82.55 provides: 
Every motion for review shall be in 
writing, and shall specify in detail the 
particular errors and objections. Such 
motions must be filed within fifteen days 
of the date of any order of the administra-
tive law judge or commission unless further 
time is granted by the administrative law 
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judge or commission within fifteen days, 
and unless so filed, said order shall 
become the award of the commission and 
shall be final. 
Rule 490-1-5 provides: 
Whenever a notice or othef paper 
requiring or permitting some action on 
behalf of a party is served on a party by 
mail, three (3) days shall be added to the 
prescribed period contained in this Rules 
or in the Workers' Compensation Act. 
Rule 6(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which 
applies since February 16, 1987, was President's Day, a State 
Holiday, reads: 
In computing any period oi time pre-
scribed or allowed by these rul 
local rules of any district court, by order 
of court, or by any applicable 
day of the act, event, or default from 
which the designated period of 
to run shall not be included. 
of the period so computed shall] 
included, unless it is a Saturday, a 
Sunday, or a legal holiday, in 
the period runs until the end of the next 
Sunday, or a 
the office of the Indus-
day which is not a Saturday, a 
legal holiday^ (emphasis added) 
It is clear that the Petitioner's argument did not 
accurately calculate the due date, because February 16, 1987 was 
a National and State holiday. Moreover, 
trial Commission was closed, thus, no filings could be made that 
day. (See Addendum 1, letter of Barbara Elcerio, legal coun-
sel, Industrial Commission). 
An accurate calculation of the |due date would be made by 
counting as follows: 
es, by the 
statute, the 
time begins 
The last day 
be 
which event 
15 
January 29, 1987 
January 30, 1987 
January 31, 1987 
February 1, 1987 
February 2, 1987 
February 3, 1987 
February 4, 1987 
February 5, 1987 
February 6, 1987 
February 7, 1987 
February 8, 1987 
February 9, 1987 
February 10, 1987 
February 11, 1987 
February 12, 1987 
February 13, 1987 
February 14, 1987 
February 15, 1987 
February 16, 1987 
February 17, 1987 
That to the knowledge 
Motion for Review was in fact, 
(not inc luded , see Rule 6 ( a ) ) 
1st day 
2nd day 
3rd day 
4th day 
5th day 
6th day 
7th day 
8th day 
9th day 
10th day 
11th day 
12th day 
13th day 
14th day 
15th day 
1st day additional for mailing 
Rule 490-1-5 
2nd day additional for mailing 
Rule 490-1-5 
3rd day additional for mailing 
Rule 490-1-5 
Date filing due if not a Holiday 
Date Due 
of counsel for Respondent, the 
delivered to the Industrial 
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Commission on February 17, 1987, the date due, by his staff. (See 
Addendum 2, Affidavit of C. Richard Henriksen, Jr.) 
Counsel for Respondent was in Provo and was not sure he 
could file the Motion for Review that day so Respondent requested 
an extension of time for filing the Motion for Review earlier on 
February 17, 1987, from Judge Martinez, in case it became neces-
sary. Upon his return from Provo, counsel for Respondent was 
able to prepare the Motion For Review and it was hand-delivered 
timely on February 17, 1987. The Industrial Commission has the 
power under Section 35-1-82.55 Utah Code Annotated, to grant an 
extension and the decision of the Commission dated July 13, 1987 is 
evidence of such extension. The timeliness of the filing of the 
Motion for Review would not have been questioned in any event 
because as a general practice the Commission does not address 
timeliness of filing when an item is a day or two late. (See 
Addendum 1, letter of Barbara Elcerio, LJegal Counsel, Industrial 
Commission) . 
B. Assuming arguendo the Respondents Motion for Review 
was actually not received and stamped until February 19, 1987, the 
Industrial Commission still had jurisdiction to enter its Order. 
1. The Workers Compensation Act is to be liberally 
construed in favor of granting compensate ion and substantial com-
pliance with its requirements is suffici ent
 ( 
The purpose of the Workers Comjj 
remedial. As such, both the legislatur 
ensation system is 
and the Supreme Court 
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have determined that its provisions are to be liberally construed 
in favor of granting compensation. McPhie v. Industrial Commis-
sion, 567 P.2d 153, 155. We are also reminded that the Workers 
Compensation statute, like other statutes, should be liberally 
construed to effect the purpose of the statute and justice. See 
Chandler v„ Industrial Commission, 55 Utah 43, 21, 184 P.2d 1020, 
1021 (1919) and Prows v. Industrial Commission, 610 P.2d 1362 
(Utah, 1980). 
Section 68-3-2 Utah Code Annotated provides: 
The rule of the common law that 
statutes in derogation thereof are to be 
strictly construed has no application to 
the statutes of this state. The statutes 
establish the laws of this state respecting 
the subjects to which they relate, and 
their provisions and all proceedings under 
them are to be liberally construed with a 
view to effect the objects of the statutes 
and to promote justice. Whenever there is 
any variance between the rules of equity 
and the rules of common law in reference to 
the same matter the rules of equity shall 
prevail. (emphasis added) 
The Utah State Legislature has specifically mandated that 
the Commission and the Courts avoid over-technical applications of 
procedure which might deny fair compensation to injured claimants. 
Section 35-1-33 reads: 
A substantial compliance with the require-
ments of this title shall be considered 
sufficient to give effect to the orders of 
the Commission, and they shall not be con-
sidered inoperative,, illegal, or void for 
any omission of a technical nature, 
(emphasis added) 
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The Court in Morrison-Knudsen Construction Co. v. Indus-
trial Commission, P.2d 138, stated that "proceedings before the 
Industrial Commission need not be as technical as are those in the 
Courts". Jxi., at P. 141. (Citing Sectiork 35-1-33, the Court 
allowed the Commission to consider and tj>ase its findings on hear-
say evidence). 
Additionally, there appears to[be a very apparent problem 
in the timely stamping and filing of documents at the Industrial 
Commission, which has caused the Industrial Commission to overlook 
filings a day or two late. (See Addendum 1, letter of Barbara 
Elcerio, Legal Counsel, Industrial Commit 
An example of this filing probl< 
record. A letter written by counsel for 
4, 1986, was received and stamped at counsel for Respondents' 
office on December 5, 1987 (See Addendunj 3) but not stamped as 
being filed at the Industrial Commission until December 8, 1987, 
three days later. (R. at 242). Also the Medical Panel Report dated 
December 11, 1987, (R. at 246) is not stamped as being filed by the 
Commission until December 17, 1987. A l| 
Respondent dated and mailed January 16, 
being filed until January 20, 1987. (R. 
This problem is not limited to 
example, Respondent's Motion for Review 
ssion). 
em is on page 242 of the 
Appellant dated December 
etter from Counsel for 
1987 is not stamped as 
at 252.) 
mailed documents. For 
Industrial Commission on February 17, 1987 and not stamped as filed 
was hand-delivered to the 
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until February 19, 1987. (R. at 271.) Another example of a hand-
delivery problem was Petitioners Petition for Writ of Review (R. at 
290-292) which was hand-delivered to the office of counsel for 
Respondent August 12, 1987 (See Addendum 4) and the Court of 
Appeals on August 12, 1987 and hand-delivered to Industrial Com-
mission August 12, 1987, (R. at 292). However, it was not stamped 
as being filed at the Commission until December 13, 1987 (R. at 
290) 1 
In this light and pursuant to authority granted to the 
Industrial Commission, it is little wonder why the Industrial 
Commission does not and should not reject documents, motions, etc., 
for being untimely stamped as filed if only one or two days late. 
(See Addendum 1, letter of Barbara Elcerio, legal counsel, Indus-
trial Commission). 
Also, in this light, where the timing of a particular 
Motion may be crucial, we are left to ponder what date should the 
Commission and the Court use as a basis for decision: 1) the date 
of hand-delivery by counsel or 2) date of stamping and filing which 
may be one, two, three or more days later. Obvious injustice would 
occur if the fact that a date stamp done tardy were used to reject 
a document timely delivered by counsel. 
Cases cited by the Petitioner are not compelling under 
our facts, nor are they controling, Watson v. Anderson, 29 Utah.2d 
36, 504 P.2d 1003 (1973); Prowswood, Inc. v. Mountain Fuel Sup-
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ply Co., 676 P.2d 952 (Utah 1984); and ktate v. Johnson, 700 P.2d 
1125 (Utah 1985). In Watson, Supra, th^ Court dismissed the 
Appellants Appeal because it was filed 4 1/2 months beyond the 30 
day appeal period. In State v. Johnson] Supra, the Court dis-
missed a criminal defendant's appeal because of the failure to 
timely pay the filing fee. In Prowswood, Supra, the Court also 
dismissed an appeal for the failure of Appellant to pay the 
required filing fee. 
In Lantham v. Industrial Commist 
1986) the Court referred to Section 35-1 
statute without explanation. In Lantham, Supra, the Court was 
faced with the issue as to when a Motion for Review should be 
filed for an interlocutory or temporary 
that although the Motion for Review was 
interlocutory order, since the Motion fdr Review was filed within 
15 days of the Final Order, it was timely. The Court made a ruling 
based in fairness and equity of facts existing in that case. 
In Retherford v. Industrial Commission, 60 Utah Adv. 
Rep.61 (Utah Court App. 1987) the Court 
sion, 717 P.2d 255 (Utah, 
-82.55 and recites the 
order. The Court held 
filed 43 days after the 
dealt solely with issue of 
whether or not a Petition for Writ of Rejview was filed in a timely 
manner with the Court of Appeals as requlired in Section 35-1-83 
Utah Code Annotated. 
It is clear then, that the Respondent's filing of its 
Motion for Review February 17, 1987 was timely and that the late 
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date stamp which was later than the actual hand-delivery by the 
Industrial Commission should not be used to deny recovery. 
2. Because of the purposes of the Workers Compen-
sation, Act even in the absence of timely filing where delay is not 
excessive or fair, the Industrial Commission has, under the proper 
circumstances and in interest of justice, have authority to waive 
timeliness of filing . 
In a civil case, where because of excusable neglect a 
default judgment or other order is entered, under proper circum-
stances under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure the 
judgment or order may be set aside. Rule 60(b) provides in perti-
nent part: 
On motion and upon such terms as are 
just, the court may in the furtherance of 
justice relieve a party or his legal repre-
sentative from a final judgment, order, or 
proceeding for the following reasons: (1) 
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excus-
able neglect... or (7) any other reason 
justifying relief from the operation of the 
judgment. 
In Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., 260 P.2d 741, (Utah, 1953), 
the Court stated: 
The allowance of a vacation of judg-
ment is a creature of equity designed to 
relieve against harshness of enforcing a 
judgment, which may occur through pro-
cedural difficulties, the wrongs of the 
opposing party, or misfortune to which 
prevent the presentation of a claim or 
defense. (260 P.2d 742.) 
The Court also stated: 
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Discretion must be exercised in fur-
therance of justice and the court will 
incline toward granting relief in a doubt-
ful case to the end that the party may have 
a hearing. Hurd v. Ford, 74 Utah 46, 276 
P.908. However, the movant must show that 
he has shown due diligence and that he was 
prevented from appearing by circumstances 
of which he had no control. Peterson 
v. Crosier, 29 Utah 235, 81 P.£860. 
P.2d at 743) 
(260 
The Court, in Katz v. Pierce, ^32 P.2d 92, 41 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 12, (9/10/86), held that: 
The District Court judges lare vested 
with considerable discretion under this 
rule in granting or denying a Motion to Set 
Aside a Judgment. The Court should be 
generally indulgent toward setting a judg-
ment aside whether it is reasonable justi-
fication or excuse for the defendant's 
failure to answer and when timely applica-
tion is made...Where there is doubt about 
whether a default should be set aside, that 
doubt should be resolved in favor of doing 
so. (41 Utah Adv. Rep. at 13. See Also 
Russell v. Mar tell, 681 P. 2d 11J93 (Utah, 
1981) 
The same reasoning and purpose lof Rule 60(b) has been 
applied in Workers Compensation cases. 
In Fink v. Industrial Commission, 689 P.2d 708 (Colorado, 
1984) the Colorado Court of Appeals determined that although a 
Petition for Review was filed four days 
mistake by an employee of the Appeals Se 
upon which counsel for Petitioner relied 
timeliness. 
after the deadline, a 
ption of the Commission 
upon, warranted waiver of 
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In Cook v. Industrial Commission, 651 P.2d 365 (Arizona, 
1982) in a unanimous decision of the Supreme Court of Arizona the 
issue involved the filing five days late of a Request for Review. 
The Court held that the attorney's substitute secretary's 
inaccurate notation, which resulted in late filing, warranted 
waiver of timely filing requirement where delay not excessive nor 
prejudical. See also Chavez v. Industrial Commission, 576 P.2d 
134 (Crt. of App. Arizona, 1977) late filing of one day waived for 
good cause-miscalculation; Parsons v. Bekins Freight, 493 P.2d 913 
(Arizona, 1972) late filing of 10 days waived for good cause, late 
doctor report and ambiguous notice). 
The Utah Supreme Court has also recognized the Industrial 
Commission's authority to waive the timeliness requirement of a 
Motion for Review in an Employment Security case. Section 35-4-
1(a) provides that a review of a decision involving contribution 
liability shall be filed within ten days of the decision. Section 
35-4-10(b) provides that an appeal to an appeal referee shall be 
made within ten days. 
In Jones v. Department of Employment Security, 641 P.2d 
156 (Utah, 1982) held that the unemployment compensation recipient 
had not timely filed his appeal to the appeal referee within ten 
days and thus the appeal referee had no jurisdiction to hear the 
case. 
In Thiessens v. Department of Employment Security, 663 
P.2d 72 (Utah, 1983), the court held that an untimely appeal to 
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the appeals section by an unemployment Compensation claimant could 
be heard, if under the Industrial Commission's rule the claimant 
could show good cause for the delay in filing. The court clearly 
recognizes the power of the Industrial Commission to allow a late 
filing of an administrative appeal if the claimant could show good 
cause. 
This recognized ability of the Industrial Commission is 
also supported by the decisions on the cases of Wood v. Depart-
ment of Employment Security, 680 P.2d 38 (Utah, 1984), Kirkwood 
v. Department of Employment Security, 709 P.2d 1158 (Utah, 1985) 
and Mini Spas Inc. v. Industrial Commission, 51 Utah Adv. Rep. 13 
(Feb. 3, 1987). 
The Industrial Commission in Wcbrkers Compensation has 
also adopted a policy to allow the consideration of untimely 
filings of Motions for Review. (See Addendum 1, letter of Barbara 
Alcerio, legal counsel, Industrial Commission). 
The Court, in order to fulfill the mandate of Section 35-
1-33 Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended) should allow the 
Industrial Commission to waive non-excessive, non-prejudicial late 
filings for good cause shown. If the purposes of the liberality 
of Workers Compensation are to be fulfilled, certainly claimants 
here should be allowed at least the samq 
tion of the laws as civil litigants due 
employment security cases under Industrie 
equity and equal protec-
under Rule 60(b), and 
al Commission Employment 
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Security rule 475-6c-8. The Court should adopt this equitable 
principle and allow the Industrial Commission latitude to consider 
Motions for Review on their merits and not remove from considera-
tion of Industrial Commission by technical rules or mistakes. 
Particularly, in this case, where the untimeliness if any was 
caused by the Industrial Commission's own recognized dating and 
filing problems. 
CONCLUSION 
The Utah Supreme Court has frequently and consistently 
held that repetitive exertions which cumulate in injury are com-
pensable under the Workers Compensation Act. In Allen, and since, 
the Court has looked at repetitiveness as a factor making an 
exertion unusual for the purpose of the higher legal causation 
test. Mrs. Lamoreaux's injuries resulted from this type of cumu-
lative exertion. 
The purpose of the higher legal causation standard, where 
the claimant has a pre-existing injury, is to protect employers 
from having to pay for injuries which the employee brought with 
him. It protects the employer where the work he provides is not 
the causal agent. The higher standard does not serve that purpose 
in the present case, because the injury did not pre-exist Mrs. 
Lamoreaux's employment with Petitioner, but was in fact caused by 
it. 
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Finally, given the remedial purpose ot the Act, ana tne 
fact that Mrs. Lamoreaux has suffered a compensable injury, the 
dating and filing problem of the Industrial Commission, and the 
power of the Industrial Commission, the court should hold the 
Respondents' Motion for Review was filed timely, or that an 
extension for filing or that the Commission has the recognized 
power to waive timeliness of the Motion. 
The Industrial Commission's Orde 
Review and awarding compensation to Respondent should be affirmed, 
DATED this 2nd day of March, 1988. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
ftjLc<*7 
er g r a n t i n g Motion for 
C. "Richard /Hgftirikse: 
At torney Tor Resp, 
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that four (4) true and correct copies of 
the foregoing instrument were HAND-DEL IVERED on this 3rd day of 
March, 1988, to the following counsel of record: 
MICHAEL E. DYER 
STEPHANIE A. MALLORY 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & 
NELSON 
CSB Tower, Suite 700 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
Varian - Eimac, Inc. and/or 
Employers Mutual Liability Insurance 
ERIE V. BOORMAN, Administrator 
SECOND INJURY FUND 
160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0580 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
160 East 300 South 
P.O. Box 5800 
S a l t L a k e C i t y , U tah 84110-5800 
i€£l&t£^ 
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Norman H Bangerter 
Governor 
Frances T Moffat 
Director 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT DIVISION 
160 East 300 South 
PO Box 510250 
Salt Lake City Utah 84151 -0250 
Toll Free 1 -800-426-0667 
February 26, 19$8 
Stephen M Hadley 
Chairman 
L L Nielsen 
Commissioner 
John Florez 
Commissioner 
Roger Henriksen 
Attorney 
320 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Dear Mr. Henriksen: 
e Heber Wells Building at a 
d and then delivered to the 
to Administration where it 
he Industrial Commission is 
This letter is in response to your inquiry regarding general Industrial 
Commission procedure. The Industrial Commission is a state agency recognizing 
all state holidays including President's Day. Therefore, The Industrial Commission 
was closed for business on February 16, 1987. 
All Industrial Commission mail is received at t 
central distribution mail room where it is hand-sort 
third floor. Industrial Commission mail is deliverer 
is again hand-sorted according to which division of 
indicated on the envelope. When the Industrial Accident Division gets its mail 
from Administration, the mail is placed in a basket to be stamped in. The fore-
going process may take several days to complete. Although the stamp at the 
upper right hand corner states ,frecievedff on a certain date, that date is not 
necessarily the date the mail got to the Heber Wells Building or even the Indus-
trial Commission. That stamped date is at best an approximation of the date of 
receipt. Realizing the stamped date may vary several days from actual receipt 
of the item at issue, the Commission maintains the general practice of not 
addressing timeliness of filing where an item is mailed and only one or two days 
are at issue. I hope this adequately answers your question regarding Industrial 
Commission procedure. 
BY DIRECTION: 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
-4. 
i~~£s<~ 
Barbara 
Legal 
Elicerio 
Counsel 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT DIVISION 
Stephen M Hadlev 
, _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ,_ Chairman 
u ™ , ™ u D „ • 160 East 300 South 
Norman H Bangerter ., ^
 n_.. c , , ^ r t L L Nielsen 
Commtsj.finf r G.^rnor ° 0 Box 510250 
Frances T Moffat Salt Lake C.ty Utah 84151-0250 February 26, 1988 John Florez 
Director Toll Free 1 -800-426-0667 Commissioner 
Timothy Shea 
Clerk of the Court of Appeals 
230 South 500 East, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Dear Mr. Shea: 
This letter will act as notice to you and the Court that there has been yet 
another change in the manner in which Industrial Commission workers compensation 
appeals will be handled* It is unfortunate that the representation of the Indus-
trial Commission on appeal has been in a state of transition ever since the Court 
first began hearing cases. Hopefully, this is the last time I will need to commu-
nicate with you on this particular topic. 
On February 17, 1988, I confirmed with Earl Dorius, Assistant Attorney General 
and Division Chief for the Governmental Affairs Division, that the Attorney GeneralTs 
office would agree to provide representation for the Industrial Commission Indus-
trial Accident Division (formerly the Workers Compensation Division) on appeals to 
the Court of Appeals. The Attorney General's office has decided to proceed in the 
same manner as it did formerly on workers compensation appeals to the Supreme Court. 
In other words, the Attorney General will provide representation for the Industrial 
Commission in cases where the party aligned with the Industrial Commission is not 
represented by counsel. In cases where the respondent or respondents aligned with 
the Industrial Commission is/are represented by counsel, the Attorney General will 
not make an appearance on behalf of the Industrial Commission. I will continue 
to monitor all cases on appeal to the Court of Appeals. I will be writing Mark 
Wainwright, Assistant Attorney General, in each case appealed informing him whe-
ther he will need to to appear on behalf of the Industrial Commission and I will 
copy the Court with those letters. 
Specifically, this new understanding will effect only one case currently on 
appeal. That case is : 
Varian-Eimac, Inc. and/or Employers Mutual Liability 
Insurance v. Helen D. Lamoreaux, the Second Injury 
Fund and the Industrial Commission of Utah, Case No. 
870344-CA 
The Industrial Commission originally indicated it would be making a separate 
appearance in this matter. The Respondent briefs are due March 3, 1988. I have 
discussed the matter with Roger Henriksen, counsel for Helen D. Lamoreaux, the 
party aligned with the Industrial Commission on appeal. Mr. Henriksenrs arguments 
on appeal are identical to the arguments the Industrial Commission had intended 
on making and so Mr. Henriksen and I have agreed there is no need for the Indus-
trial Commission to file a separate brief. By a copy of this letter, I am noti-
fying the other parties to this appeal of the Industrial Commission's decision 
in this respect. 
Once again, I apologize for the confusion that has been cause by the changes. 
I encourage you and your staff to call me with any questions of concerns you may 
have with respect to this final change. 
BY DIRECTION: 
. W* i TT • • u*. T, u .i INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
cc: Mark Wainwright, Roger Henriksen, 
Michael Dyer, Erie Boorman, Stepha-
n-f o Mai 1 nrv 
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS, ST|ATE OF UTAH 
VARIAN - EIMAC, INC., and/or 
EMPLOYERS MUTUAL LIABILITY 
INSURANCE, 
Petitioners/Appellants, 
v. 
HELEN D. LAMOREAUX, THE SECOND 
INJURY FUND, and THE UTAH 
STATE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, 
Respondents. 
COURT OF APPEALS 
Case No. 870344-CA 
Category 6 
AFFIDAVIT OF C. RICHARD HENJRIKSEN, JR. 
The H o n o r a b l e G i l b e r t A. [ M a r t i n e z 
A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Law j j i dge 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
County of Salt Lake ) 
COMES NOW C. Richard Henriksen, Jr., after first being 
sworn, deposes and swears as follows: 
1. That I am a duly licensed Attorney in the State of 
Utah and attorney for Respondant. 
2. That on February 17, 1987, II was in Provo, Utah 
working on a case and realized I may havd difficulty in filing 
the Motion for Review in this case on that date. 
3. That I called the Honorable Gilbert A. Martinez, 
Administrative Law Judge of the Industrial Commission and left a 
message at his office that I may need an additional few days to 
file the Motion for Review and if that was not permissable, 
please call my secretary, Judy Banks Garrett. 
4. That upon my return to the office from Provo, we 
had not heard back from Judge Martinez, so to be sure we were 
timely, I prepared and my secretary typed the Motion for Review. 
5. That we mailed the Motion for Review to those 
persons shown on the Mailing Certificate and had either Judy 
Banks Garrett, Paul B. Ellis or Stephen Buhler deliver the Motion 
for Review to the Industrial Commission for filing. 
6. That because of the shortness of time, the typo-
graphical error on Page 3 Commission of the date line and signa-
ture line) I corrected by hand those lines as our messenger went 
out the door. 
7. That I have spoken to the Industrial Commission to 
see if they have a record of my telephone message to Judge 
Martinez on February 17, 1987 and they do not have such a record; 
however, Judge Martinez told me he receives such calls a dozen 
times per day and not all messages are saved. 
8. That to my best knowledge and belief the Motion for 
Review was filed with the Industrial Commission on February 17, 
1987, the due date. 
2 
9. Further, Affiant sayeth n^t. 
DATED this 2nd day of March, 1^88 
C. RT* chard 
l\AuU. f^JofJ^-
ksen,/^. 'Af f iant 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before |me this 2nd day of March, 
1988. 
LM y uyv v / &ciJ,v MOLhrft 
NOTARY PUBLIC, 
Residing 
My Commission Expi res : 
a t S a l t Lake Co. , Utah 
-U 
3 
ADDENDUM 3 
31 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
A P R O F E S S I O N A L LAW C O R P O R A T I O N 
C S B T O W E R - S O SOUTH MAIN —SUITE ? 0 0 
P O BOX 2 4 6 5 
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 8«HO 
WILLIAM S/RICHARDS PC 
ROBERT W BRANDT 
P KEITH NELSON 
M KENTCHRISTOPHERSON 
GARY O/STOTT 
GARY e( FERGUSON 
ROBERT L STEVENS 
NELSON L HAYES 
DAVI© L BARCLAY 
JOHN L YOUNG 
OAV/O K LAURIT2EN 
LYNN S DAVIES 
ROBERT G GILCHRIST 
MICHAEL E DYER 
RUSSELL C FERICKS 
MICHAEL K MOHRMAN 
MICHAEL P ZACCHEO 
GARY L JOHNSON 
STEPHANIE A MALLORY 
RlCHARO L KING 
MICHAEL L SCHWAB 
DEC 0 5 198$ 
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TELEPHONE 
(SOD 531-1777 
December 4, 1986 
Judge Gilbert A. Martinez 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
160 East 300 South 
P.O. Bos^.5580 
Salt Like City, Utah 84145-0580 
Re: Helen D. Lamoreaux v. Varjian-EIMAC, Inc. 
Our File No.: 25766-190 
Claim No.: D57-14511 
Date of Injury: 11/15/85 
Dear Judge Martinez: 
Please accept this letter as a 
memorandum in the above matter based upo 
decision of Allen v. Industrial Commissi 
74, 1986, No. 20026. In general terms, 
proposition that, if a worker has a pree: 
worker must prove unusual or extraordina: 
meet legal causation. If the worker doei 
preexisting condition, usual or ordinary 
supplemental 
the recent landmark 
m, filed November 
illen stands for the 
listing condition, the 
fy exertion in order to 
not have a 
sxertion is sufficient. 
In the case of Helen Lamoreaux,! the applicant herein, 
the evidence is clear that Mrs. Lamoreaux was suffering from a 
preexisting condition. As fairly noted in the Summary of 
Testimony, Mrs. Lamoreaux injured her back in an automobile 
accident as early as 1958. While Mrs. Lamoreaux claimed not to 
have had back problems immediately following the automobile 
accident, she did have low-back pain later on in life prior to 
the alleged industrial incident of November 15, 1985. 
Significantly, Dr. Bauman recorded her history as follows: 
She has a previous history of bkck 
problems which dates back over a"couple of 
years. She had had mild aching back at 
the end of the day. She had never missed 
any work or had any leg pain associated 
with the back pain which she had had. Her 
job involves lifting 10- and 184pound 
Judge Gilbert A. Martinez 
December 4, 1986 
Page 2 
objects all day long. For some reason when 
she lifted this one time off the shelf she 
felt a sudden pain in her back which went 
down into her left leg. (Emphasis 
supplied.) 
The applicant's low-back pain was sufficiently severe 
that she sought medical treatment on several occasions prior to 
her alleged injury on November 15, 1986. For example, Dr. 
Wayne Zundel noted in his clinical data the following diagnosis 
of the applicant on April 22, 1985: 
Arthritis — was much improved until she 
lifted tubes at work and irritated back. 
Next morning bent over to pick up a child 
and had sudden onset of severe, 
non-radiating low-back pain. Better today, 
but still disabling. 
(Exhibit D-l at 45.) 
Clearly, the applicant was suffering from preexisting 
arthritis in the spine which, on occasion, became disabling due 
to pain. Because of the preexisting nature of the applicant's 
injuries, the higher standard elucidated in the Allen 
decision must be applied. 
The question then becomes whether or not the lifting 
of an object weighing 18 1/2 pounds is, on an objective basis, 
an unusual or extraordinary effort. The answer to that 
question is clearly ,fncff based upon the direct analysis of rhe 
Utah Supreme Court in the Allen decision. In footnote 8 of 
Allen, the Supreme Court defined in part the "usual wear and 
tear of life — which certainly includes lifting objects 
weighing 20 pounds, such as bags of golf clubs, minnow pails, 
and stepladders." (Allen, footnote 8 at 16.) (Emphasis 
supplied.) 
It is undisputed in the present case that the 
applicant was lifting only 18 1/2 pounds at the time of her 
alleged incident. Directly applying the Supreme Court's 
analysis of Allen to this case, it cannot be reasonably 
stated that Mrs. Lamoreaux was engaged in activities of an 
unusual or extraordinary nature. Therefore, based upon the 
Judge Gilbert A. Martinez 
December 4, 1986 
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analysis in Allen, the defendants respectfully submit that 
the applicant has failed in her burden 4s to legal causation, 
and her claim must be denied. 
Thank you for your consideration of this matter. 
Very trully yours, 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELE 
Michael 
MED8/al y 
cc: C. Richard Henriksen^ 
Erie V. Boorman 
Wausau Insurance Companies 
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Telephone: (801) 531-1777 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
— oooOooo —L-
VARIAN - EIMAC, INC. AND/OR 
EMPLOYERS MUTUAL LIABILITY 
INSURANCE, 
Petitioners, 
vs. 
HELEN D. LAMOREAUX, THE SECOND 
INJURY FUND, AND THE UTAH STATE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, 
Respondents. 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF REVIEW 
Case No. 86000755 
COURT OF APPEALS # -CA 
Category #6 
— - oooOooo — + 
Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, §35-1-83 (1986), and 
Rule 14 of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, petitioners 
Varian - Eimac, Inc. and/or Employers Mutual Liability 
Insurance, by and through their counsel of record, petition the 
Court for review of the Order of the Industrial Commission dated 
July 13, 1987 granting defendant Lamoreaux's Motion for Review. 
Petitioners seek review of the <prder aforementioned on 
the following grounds: 
1. The Commission had no jurisdiction to enter its 
order of July 13, 1987, as respondent Lamoreaux's Motion for 
Review of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order of 
the Administrative Law Judge was not timely filed pursuant to the 
requirements of U.C.A. §35-1-82.55 and the Order of the 
Administrative Law Judge. The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, and Order of the Administrative Law Judge thus constituted a 
final Order from which no relief could be granted. 
2. The industrial incident of November 15, 1985 does 
not constitute a compensable industrial accident for purposes of 
Utah Worker's Compensation Law inasmuch as the applicant was 
suffering from a preexisting condition at the time of her injury 
and she failed to establish the requisite legal causation 
necessary to render the incident compensable where a preexisting 
condition is involved as per the standards set forth in Allen v. 
Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986). 
3. If respondent Lamoreaux suffered a compensable 
industrial accident on November 15, 1985, the Second Injury Fund 
is liable for a percentage of the benefits owed to her under 
U.C.A. §35-1-69 inasmuch as Ms. Lamoreaux was clearly suffering 
from a preexisting condition at the time her injury occurred. 
4. A copy of the Order of the Industrial Commission 
from which petitioners seek review is attached hereto as Exhibit 
A. 
-2 
DATED this JhL day of 1987. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
4&rL<*fs. <6A 
E. Dyer 
A. Mallory 
tys for Petitioners 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true ana correct copy of the 
foregoing instrument was hand delivered on the j^faf day of 
vs^^^r , 1987, to the following counsel of record: 
Utah State Industrial Commission 
P.O. 5800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-5800 
C. Richard Henriksen, Jr. 
HENRIKSEN, HENRIKSEN & CALL, P.|C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
320 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Erie V. Boorman 
Administrator 
Second Injury Fund 
160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
LAM/01/SAM1 
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